STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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MANNING THE FORCE THROUGH IMMIGRATION: MAKING THE AMERICAN DREAM WORK FOR THE ARMED FORCES

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The Force struggles with recruitment and retention. Focused recruitment on legal permanent resident immigrants, assisted by new national immigration legislation giving eligible service members the right to accelerate immigrant visa petition interviews for relatives in their country of origin, is discussed as a viable solution.

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PREFACE

For one fleeting instant, the issue of "readiness" in our Armed Services dominated the headlines during the 2000 US presidential campaign. Retired "gray beards" went public on readiness and created their own internal firestorm amongst the troops about whether it was appropriate for retired generals to have public political opinions. Meanwhile, the Pentagon ordered a media clamp down on readiness to avoid influencing the political debate. Then, as suddenly as it appeared, military readiness receded from the front page as the dominant themes of Social Security, Medicare, prescription drugs, and education reasserted themselves.

The intense rhetoric and emotion displayed during that short interlude, gave credence, in my mind, to the seriousness of the problem.

Throughout the academic year, faculty, students, visitors, and lecturers at the Army War College time and again revisited this theme. No one, it seemed, had any bright ideas on how to solve readiness and realize the National Security Strategy requirement of winning two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Conversation revolved around how the 1997 Quadrennial Review had been a resources versus strategy driven exercise. This time around, ventured some knowing souls, the Pentagon would do it right and the 2001 Quadrennial Review will be strategy driven. Hah!

And suddenly, I thought I knew why strategy would again fail to win out over resources. If we cannot recruit and retain sufficient bodies to maintain the present Force, how could we hope to expand it?

Strategists take heart. I think I have a way.

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MANNING THE FORCE THROUGH IMMIGRATION: MAKING THE AMERICAN DREAM WORK FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Over the past decade, despite major Force and budget reductions, the National Security Strategy (NSS) changed only slightly from fighting and winning two simultaneous major theater wars (MTWs) to the current strategy of fighting and winning two **nearly** simultaneous MTWs.[1] While the spin of "sole remaining superpower," no peer competitor, Force restructuring, and new technology publicly makes the Force seem capable of fulfilling the strategy, in reality this is not the case. War game after war game demonstrates the United States does not have this capability.[2] Marine and Air Force force providers readily admit they have sufficient assets for at best only 1+ MTWs.[3] Without significant change, i.e., money and manpower for a larger, better equipped Force, the reality of today's National Military Strategy foresees three stages: 1) fight and win the first MTW; 2) fight to stalemate or possibly lose the second MTW; and 3) fight and win or reconquer the second MTW after winning the first.[4]

If it remains in the national interest to organize to win two MTWs, Pentagon leaders must explain to the Congress and the President why the current Force is inadequate and what resources it needs to meet the NSS. Assuming this reckoning happens and our strategy remains unchanged, the issue of readiness to implement that strategy leaps to center stage.

The present readiness debate has been ongoing since the Gulf War. Force and budget reductions, increased OPTEMPO, proliferation of small-scale contingency deployments, prosperous US economy, expanded junior college system, feminization of the military, and a variety of other reasons combined to make America's civilian youth question the desirability of military service.[5] For those already in the service, as OPTEMPO increased, concerns about training, equipment, economic and physical well-being, and quality of life became commonplace amongst service members and their families.[6] The 90s saw high attrition rates, retention percentages shrink, and recruitment numbers fall short.[7]

Having little recent experience with recruitment shortfalls, the Army and the Navy decided to increase the numbers of high school drop outs admitted into their services.[8] Despite the lowered admission standard, bigger recruiting resources, and larger enlistment incentives, the Services still found it difficult to meet recruitment goals.[9] In FY 98, the Navy enlisted 55,300, 12 percent fewer than required. The Army missed its goal of 72,600 by one percent. The Air Force and Marines met their goals, but the Air Force did so only through accelerated start dates for those who had agreed to come on board[10] and by taking more people without previous Air

Force experience into the Reserves.[11] In FY 99 the Army missed by 6300 recruits and the Air Force by 1700 while the Navy and Marines met recruiting numbers.[12]

AMERICA'S YOUTH QUESTIONS MILITARY SERVICE -- THE RECRUITMENT POOL SHRINKS

Just after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, military recruiters began encountering resistance from America's youth to enlisting in the Armed Forces. The pundits said Iraqi forces were formidable. While America would surely prevail, the cost in American casualties might be in the thousands.[13] This unattractive prospect caused discerning young people to question anew why they should enlist to fight other people's wars. America's twenty year experiment with an all-volunteer force, despite wholesale reductions in personnel requirements, was suddenly having difficulty finding the approximately 200,000 men and women needed annually to replenish and sustain itself.

Overnight, the pool of prime recruits, said recruiters, had shrunk.[14] Their mantra: Of the estimated ten million U.S. males between 17 and 21, 41 percent are academically disqualified because of low test scores or lack of a high school diploma. 23 percent are medically or morally unfit. 15 percent are in college. 5 percent are already in the services or have already served and another 2 percent are in prison. This leaves us just 14 percent or 1.4 million males available to fill 200,000 recruitment slots. It is an uphill battle.[15]

To the suggestion that the Services simply recruit more women, statistics showed enlistee attrition rates, i.e., those who do not complete enlistment terms, were significantly higher for women than for men. 43 percent of the women who joined the Army in 1995 failed to complete their enlistment contracts versus 28 percent for men.[16] Women comprised 14 percent of the Armed Forces, but accounted for 18 percent of the enlistees. White women made up 55 percent of all women soldiers, but also accounted for the highest percentage to leave the service after first enlistment, i.e., 40 percent versus 33 percent for blacks and 31 percent for Hispanics.[17] Thus, because the package of recruitment, training, and retention cost real dollars, the question of gender plays a part in determining where the Services concentrate their recruiting efforts.

WHAT COUNTS MOST? QUALITY OR QUANTITY?

By FY 2000, however, all the Services, for the first time in years, met recruitment goals. FY 2001 appears likely to see repeat success.[18] Such being the case, some in the Army profess to have "licked" the recruitment problem.[19] Maybe, but others say the deed is done at the altar of expediency, i.e., lowered admission, training, and retention standards. If the latter, this portends problems for the Army as Department of Defense (DOD) research shows that there is a strong relationship between education credentials and successful completion of the first term of military service; that education attainment predicts first-term military attrition; and that recruitment quality is linked to job performance.[20] Further, recruitment success is being paid for by all branches with either increased intake of recruits without high school diplomas, monthly stipends and college loans for recruits to go to college before coming on active duty, or increased average time and money spent getting candidates enlisted.[21]

ST 3-0, Operations, dated 1 October 2000, states: "the Army needs competent and versatile soldiers able to accomplish missions in a challenging and ever changing global environment...[22] They must employ and maintain increasingly complex and sophisticated equipment. Current and future technology requires skilled soldiers who understand their systems."[23]

Is there conflict between recruitment standards and Army requirements? Is there risk? Can an Army with significant numbers of its soldiers lacking a high school diploma meet Army challenges?[24] In FY 97, with ten percent of its enlistees listed as high school dropouts, the Army already compared poorly with the Air Force, i.e., only 58 percent of the Army's recruits versus 77 percent of the Air Forces had a high school diploma and a score of 50-99 percent on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) test.[25]

Clearly, in the Services' drive to meet recruitment numbers, the Army and Navy accept attrition and performance risk with substandard recruits. To address studies that show a strong correlation between a diploma and completion of basic training, the Army created "Insist and Assist," a program of remedial military drills and English language courses for "slow" learners to help them "survive" basic training. The results have been admirable as the failure rate at the Army's largest training camp, Fort Jackson, plunged from 23 percent in December 1998 to less than 10 percent a year later.[26] Today, the Army boasts of an overall 98 percent basic training graduation rate.[27] Meanwhile, the infamous Marine Corp Parris Island boot camp failure rate has dropped from 20 percent to about 10 percent.[28]

Bravo! But what about the staying power and functionality of these soldiers? Research says educational achievement is a key indicator of attrition and job performance. Perhaps the research is wrong. Perhaps, everything will work out. For now, some in the Army claim to be comfortable with recruitment efforts and standards.[29] But what of the future? Ever lower qualifications; ever higher incentives are not the solutions. The Services must identify new or underdeveloped recruitment areas that can yield many, many more high school graduates with CAT IIIA and above AFQT test results.

USING IMMIGRATION TO BUILD THE FORCE

Every year, over 500,000 aliens become legal permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States. Of these, approximately 70,000[30] are unmarried and between 17 and 26 years of age.[31] If one wished to widen the age range or include married people, the number easily doubles.[32] Similar numbers of immigrants have come to the United States since 1965 when the United States changed its immigration laws to admit persons of Asian ancestry as well as other nationality groups that had been severely restricted under the former national origin quota system.

Between 1961 and 1980, 7.8 million people immigrated legally to the U.S.[33] Although the draft did not end until 1973, the 1980 census indicated only a small percentage of our immigrants served in the Armed Forces.[34] This contrasted with other periods of American history. For example, in the 1820s, 36 percent of the Army was foreign-born. In the 1850s, it was 67 percent, with 50 percent of the enlistees between 1865 and 1875 from Germany[35] and Ireland.[36] By WWII, because of legal barriers, such as citizenship intent and whether you were born in an enemy country, to service in the armed forces, only 390,406 soldiers or four percent of the Army's personnel were foreign-born.[37] In 1988 it was only two percent. Ten years later in 1998, however, the figure approximated five percent.[38]

Why immigrants of yesteryear and today appear to have different affinities towards military service can be explained by such factors as the presence or absence of US conscription laws, recruitment through immigration,[39] and the tradition of military service in the homeland of immigrant groups.[40] With appropriate recruitment techniques and retention incentives, the foreign-born can again play a prominent part.

In today's employment war between society's civilian and military components, recruiters need better tools and focus to mine effectively the "newly arrived" LPR field. There are

thousands of industrious, educated,[41] prime age youth in this population anxious to get jobs,[42] improve English skills, and Americanize themselves. A few thousand more recruits each year from the newly arrived to fill infantrymen, cooks, and transporter billets will improve Force quality and reduce pressure on recruiters to enlist as many high school dropouts.

Other reasons to spend more time recruiting in this pool are:

-- It is in the national interest to integrate new immigrants into general society as soon as possible. Military service, while not an exact replica, forces them to interact daily with Americans;

-- Immigrants are prime sources for foreign language skills and foreign area expertise, which cannot be replicated by American-grown troops. Current immigration law makes it theoretically possible for the Armed Forces to recruit directly in foreign countries for personnel with special skills not found in the US;

-- While prepared for MTWs, the expectation of frequent, small-scale contingency actions makes it desirable for the Services to have a larger cadre of foreign-born soldiers to draw from for deployment abroad. With more foreign-born troops embedded in the ranks, the need to depend on outside translators to accomplish routine communication may be alleviated;

-- Recruitment inroads with immigration populations, assuming general satisfaction, will make it easier to enlist future immigrants;

-- Special reenlistment incentives in the form of expedited naturalization (already available) and special immigration petition privileges for family members (legislation required) are inexpensive, i.e., relatively cheap, and in most cases assure reenlistment.[43]

This proposal to increase significantly the immigrant, foreign-born mix of the Armed Forces will not be easy or without risk. The capital spent by our political leaders to accomplish this may be expensive. The merits of recruiting more educated, hardworking, foreign language capable, reenlistible, foreign-born men and women to be part of the Force will need to be weighed against the concerns of communication in American English, cultural assimilation, "American" backlash and prejudice, and security.

In the 90s, as recruiters plotted to meet recruiting numbers, one of the bright ideas developed was "niche" recruitment. Recruiters looked at US demographics, compared them with the existing military make up, and discovered "under-represented" groups.

As a result, recruiters are reworking methods to target the large Latino community. Statistics showed Latinos made up 6.3 percent of the military, 7 percent of the enlisted ranks, and 3 percent of the officer corps, but 11 percent of the US 18-44 year old population.[44]

Obstacles to recruitment, especially in the newly arrived Latino immigrant community, are relatively poor English skills, low high school completion rates, and a cultural aversion to military service because of its association "with hierarchy and corruption, rather than opportunity."[45]

Some of the options contemplated to overcome these obstacles are identifying and working with Latino social organizations, visiting middle schools with large Latino populations, and revising academic requirements to allow more high school diploma equivalents. An even more fundamental proposal is to revise the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery to "eliminate cultural bias."[46]

To these options, I would expand them to include all ethnic groups and add additional considerations such as: (1) the assistance of targeted American embassy immigrant visa sections overseas and the INS at US ports of entry; (2) blanket labor certification from the US Department of Labor to enable Armed Forces recruiters to recruit foreigners directly to fill jobs without sufficient qualified candidates; and (3) national legislation offering US service members reenlisting in the Armed Forces, the privilege of expediting the immigrant visa interview of siblings, other blood relatives, and their immediate families.

The defense of the United States is a national concern. If the Services cannot find enough qualified recruits on their own, it is appropriate to seek assistance from other branches in the federal government. The Selective Service System already avails itself of DOS and INS assistance to register draft eligible immigrants with the Selective Service.[47] Therefore, it should be a relatively straightforward next step to include a military recruitment document with the Selective Service form.

The specially designed recruitment document might request the following information: Name, US Address, Date and Place of Birth, Marital Status, Education Level, English Proficiency, Foreign Languages, Interest in receiving more information about the Army/Navy/Marines/Air Force.

A notional use of this form is: The form is included as part of the packet of forms given immigrants as part of the final immigration process.[48] The immigrant completes the form and after arrival in the US mails it to DOD. DOD then distributes the form to the appropriate service recruiter for follow-up.

Another potential niche recruitment tool is blanket US Department of Labor certification that certain military jobs cannot be filled or are having difficulty filling through the existing US recruiting pool.[49] With this certification, recruiters assigned to American embassies could recruit directly overseas to find the people they need. To reduce the changes of disqualification on

security grounds, background checks could be completed on potential immigrant enlistees prior to immigration.[50]

In the future wars and conflicts for the United States in the 21st century, prognosticators foresee hotspots in Southwest Asia, the Korean Peninsula, China, and India.[51] Coincidently, while aliens from all countries are on extended wait lists to immigrate to the United States, countries such as China, India, and South Korea also happen to be amongst the largest contributors of new immigrants. Embassies there may merit recruiter attention.

SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY, OF THEE I SING -- GET ME TO AMERICA AND MY FIRST BORN IS YOURS

Most Americans, including those in the military, do not realize how difficult it is for families to immigrate to the United States. Generally, under current US immigration law, a prospective immigrant applying under the family reunification program must wait from six months, for the spouse of an American citizen, to over twenty years for the Philippine-born sibling of an American citizen, for an immigrant visa interview.[52] If the interview is successful, a visa is issued to enter the United States.

To people from China, India, Korea, the Philippines, Mexico, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nigeria and a host of other countries, the chance to live in the United States is one of the most precious opportunities the United States offers to the citizens of other nations. As such, they dream, work, and scheme to make it their reality. They study our immigration law. They learn how to overcome restrictions.[53] They learn how to immigrate.[54]

The legal way often begins with a son or daughter sent to study in the United States. The son/daughter studies, marries a legal permanent resident or American citizen, and becomes a United States LPR. After three years, if the spouse is an American, or five years, if the spouse is also a LPR, the son/daughter can finally apply for and become an American citizen.

Upon naturalization, the son/daughter files a petition for mother and/or father and all siblings to immigrate. For parents, this process is quick because there is no immigration quota for parents of citizens. Still, the time from petition to US arrival may take over a year.[55]

Upon arrival, the citizen's alien father or mother files 2nd Preference Category petitions for his or her unmarried sons and daughters. This category requires a wait of five to seven years before an immigration visa interview is available. Meanwhile, the sons and daughters must remain single because marriage causes them to lose 2nd Preference eligibility. As married

persons, they revert to the American citizen sibling 4th Preference Category obtained from their American sibling, which according to January 2001 tables entailed an approximate twelve year waiting period.[56]

Thus, to get an entire family to the United States may require decades, thorough knowledge of US immigration laws, discipline, sacrifice, and long-range planning. Many families tolerate abnormal social conditions, such as cohabitation without marriage and illegitimate children, in order to pursue legal American immigration.[57]

For those who are impatient, willing to cheat, and immigrate illegally, the process can be shortened by many years, if they are not caught. False political asylum claim, marriage of convenience, visa obtained under false pretense, and illegal entry without inspection are commonly used ways. In the eyes of the perpetrators, these are worthwhile risks pursuing the American dream. Every day, hundreds of people attempt to pass illegally through our ports of entry and unguarded borders. In China some Chinese willingly pay $50,000 to be smuggled into the US. For documents in false identities, job certifications, or marriages to US citizens, the price shoots up to as much as $80,000.[58] Dollar amounts vary from country to country, but this phenomenon is repeated the world over.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, as amended, governs US immigration. It is based on the twin principles of family reunification and the labor needs of the United States. The categories and numerical limitations for family reunification and employment are found in Sections 201 and 202 of the INA and are shown in Table 1 and Table 2.

First: Unmarried Sons and Daughters of Citizens: 23,400 plus any numbers not required for fourth preference.
Second: Spouses and Children, and Unmarried Sons and Daughters of Permanent Residents: 114,200, plus the number (if any) by which the worldwide family preference level exceeds 226,000, and any unused first preference numbers: A. Spouses and Children: 77% of the overall second preference limitation, of which 75% are exempt from the per-country limit; B. Unmarried Sons and Daughters (21 years of age or older): 23% of the overall second preference limitation.
Third: Married Sons and Daughters of Citizens: 23,400, plus any numbers not required by first and second preferences.

Fourth: Brothers and Sisters of Adult Citizens: 65,000, plus any numbers not required by first three preferences.

Table 1 - **FAMILY-SPONSORED PREFERENCES**[59]

First: Priority Workers: 28.6% of the worldwide employment-based preference level, plus any numbers not required for fourth and fifth preferences
Second: Members of the Professions Holding Advanced Degrees or Persons of Exceptional Ability: 28.6% of the worldwide employment-based preference level, plus any numbers not required by first preference.
Third: Skilled Workers, Professionals, and Other Workers: 28.6% of the worldwide level, plus any numbers not required by first and second preferences, not more than 10,000 of which to "Other Workers."
Fourth: Certain Special Immigrants
Fifth: Employment Creation: 7.1% of the worldwide level, not less than 3,000 of which reserved for investors in a targeted rural or high-unemployment area, and 3,000 set aside for investors in regional centers by Sec. 610 of P.L. 102-395.

Table 2 - **EMPLOYMENT-BASED PREFERENCES**

While most employment-based preferences categories are current, family-based preference immigrants must wait from five to twenty plus years for an immigration interview. Almost everything depends on one's country of birth and when one's relative filed the immigration petition. For example, in the 4th Preference Category, brothers and sisters of Americans, the average wait is twelve years.[60]

THE RECRUITMENT AND REENLISTMENT PLAN

It is this time factor or wait time that the military can leverage to recruit and retain newly arrived immigrants. Our recruiting pitch to the newly arrived LPR should include information about accelerated naturalization for service members, i.e., three years versus five years for non-servicemen.[61] If the prospective recruit wishes to become a citizen, his Service would assist him with that process. We would ask whether he has relatives in his country of birth waiting for or considering US immigration. If he does, we would explain that upon naturalization and reenlistment, his Service will assist him with the paperwork to have one sibling with spouse and

children jump the queue for immediate immigrant visas.[62] This will be his special reenlistment "immigration bonus."[63] If he has concerns about English, we have an English improvement program for recruits desiring this kind of assistance[64] or we can pay a monthly stipend to enable him to attend English classes before coming on active duty.[65] We inform him that when a citizen, he is eligible for Officer Candidate School (OCS) and other special military jobs reserved for citizens.[66] Finally, we tell him the story of John Shalikashvilli, an immigrant, who became a naturalized citizen, began his military career as an enlisted man, went to OCS, became a general officer, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[67]

These, especially the immigration privilege, are powerful recruiting tools. Best of all, in this era of $50,000 bonuses, the immigration reenlistment privilege is relatively free[68] and could be used a second or even third time during the course of that individual's military career. As the value of the "immigration bonus" becomes evident amongst the immigration community, recruitment from this group will increase rapidly and on board foreign-born service members will be easier to retain. By taking advantage of this unique military privilege, a reenlistee's sibling could cut immigration wait time from twelve years to less than six.[69] This factor alone will cause hundreds of thousands of LPRs and even naturalized Americans to consider enlistment and reenlistment. Especially for individuals from economically underdeveloped or politically constrained countries, who have not yet fully settled into American society, the desire to become eligible and take advantage of this privilege will be strong, if not overwhelming.

THE POWER OF THE SPECIAL IMMIGRATION PRIVILEGE

The keys to unlocking the recruitment and retention bonanza are for DOD to convince the President and the Congress our Armed Forces need significantly more people and that short of reinstating the draft, immigration legislation is the best way to accomplish it. The political leadership must first reaffirm the two MTW NSS requirement. The military must then admit it cannot fulfill the strategy without more manpower. In the same breath, it must explain why current enlistment and reenlistment tools are inadequate and quantify exactly how many more people it needs.

From this common foundation of mutual understanding, Congress, working with DOD, DOS, and INS, can then craft the immigration legislation that will generate the numbers from the LPR and naturalized citizen communities to meet the manpower requirements.[70] With more foreign-born wanting to enlist, the Services can reduce the number of recruits it accepts who have relatively poor AFQT results or who are not high school graduates. With more service

members reenlisting to take advantage of the new legislation, recruitment quotas can remain static, while Force size grows. More people signing up plus fewer people signing out can equal a better educated, trainable, larger, experienced, more effective Force.

Historically, there is ample precedent for the Congress to pass special interest immigration-related legislation. Today, certain religious workers and foreign employees of the US government overseas are examples of special immigration groups that benefit from past legislation established on their behalf. Their special immigrant visas are obtained under the employment-based 4th Preference Special Immigrant Category.

As recently November 2000, the 106th Congress recognized choke points in our immigration law and passed new legislation[71] granting temporary relief to the spouses and children of LPRs whose immigrant visa petitions have been pending immigrant visa interview for three or more years. These parties now have the right to receive nonimmigrant visas to live and work in the United States pending final processing of their cases.[72]

The initiative rests with DOD. How serious are recruitment and retention problems? Are costs per recruit and reenlistee too high? Are senior leaders representing the Army right when they say the Army's recruitment and reenlistment challenges are under control? Or is the US Commission on National Security/21st Century right when it declares the Services face severe enlistment and retention problems?

Immigration reform is a perennial theme before the Congress. If DOD decided it needed new immigration legislation in order to expand the Force, part of its presentation should be linked to how that legislation would also reduce the 4th Preference immigration interview waiting time. As the primary potential beneficiaries of this legislation would be of Hispanic origin, the Congress may be well-inclined to take up the matter.[73] The 2000 census in March 2000 confirmed what politicians have known intuitively for some time, i.e., that the Hispanic ethnic group is the fastest growing, soon to be largest minority group in the United States.[74]

In the year 2000, 10.4 percent of the population or 28.4 million foreign-born citizens and LPRs from all over the world, including 6.9 million between ages15 and 29,[75] lived in the U.S.[76] If 10.4 percent of the Force was foreign-born, would this be acceptable? Would 20 percent be too high? Where and how do we anticipate using our forces?

With answers to the above questions, Congress can tailor proposed "special immigration" legislation. If the DOD decision is to recruit and reenlist as many fully qualified service members as possible, as soon as possible, the proposed legislation might read: "For seven years from the enactment of this Act (give specific date), any active duty service member, who is an American citizen with four or more years of honorable service, and who reenlists or

otherwise agrees to an additional two years of service, may upon such formal agreement be issued a certification letter of such reenlistment or agreement signed by the XXX of his service which may be used by the service member together with the service member's notarized affidavit designating the service member's biological brother, sister or uncle or aunt of the first sanguinity, and respective spouse and children, if said brother, sister, uncle, or aunt is already the beneficiary of an approved INS petition to immigrate to the United States, to present to the American Embassy in the country of his/her residence for the purpose of immediate processing for an immigrant visa interview notwithstanding the timeliness or lack thereof of said relative's existing priority date."

Such broad terms would immediately affect service members with brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts awaiting immigration. For a two-year reenlistment or extension agreement, together with all the other reenlistment bonuses already offered, any service member eligible to take advantage of this privilege, especially if his relatives abroad learned of it, would be hard pressed not to reenlist. Two years will be viewed by many as a small price to pay to get relatives to the head of a multiyear immigration queue.

Newly arrived immigrant LPRs, themselves already having endured a lengthy wait to immigrate, would seek out recruiters for program details. People worldwide would soon know of the change in our immigration law. Remember, they are students of immigration. Immigration lawyers, eligible citizens, LPRs, and potential immigrants would review and assess what this law meant and how it could apply to them.[77] The word would spread, and soon military recruiters would once again be in the happy predicament of having to pick and choose rather than taking almost all comers in order to fill recruitment needs.

By limiting the privilege period to seven years, potential utilizers are forced to make a decision quickly. Seven years allows a newly arrived immigrant sufficient time to enlist, meet the minimum three years in the US requirement for naturalization, become a citizen, use the privilege, and decide whether he wants to use it a second time. Seven years allows the Congress and the military sufficient time to determine whether the system works, needs to be modified, or terminated.

Because many foreign-born naturalized citizens and LPRs are married or may be too old for military service, we will not see millions asking to enlist. However, we can anticipate millions of website hits and other inquiries and thousands of well-qualified, actual applicants.

To get an inkling of how well such a program might be received, one need look no further than the DOS's annual US immigration diversity lottery. Every year, for the past decade, the DOS has held a postal lottery for citizens of countries whose countrymen are underrepresented

in America's population and who wish to immigrate to the United States. Citizens from these countries are restricted to a single entry mailed to pre-determined US postal addresses during a specified period. Last year DOS received 13 million entries for the 55,000 immigration visas available under the fiscal year 2001 program.[78] In fact, because diversity immigrants are all high school graduates and at least 21, recruiters would do well to concentrate here. In FY 01 most diversity immigrants will be from Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan from Africa; Bangladesh and Pakistan from Asia; Armenia, Bulgaria, Germany, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Romania, Turkey, and Uzbekistan from Europe; and Ecuador from the Americas.[79]

With a liberal immigration law, recruitment, reenlistment, and certain military occupational specialty problems would soon disappear.[80] Recruitment budgets would be slashed.[81] Manning and expanding the Force through immigration would become reality.[82]

For those in Congress who would opt for a more managed approach, proposed legislation could be modified to reduce the Act validity period from seven to five years and to extend the privilege only to active duty service members who agreed to reenlist for four instead of two years. Additional restrictions might include a one time only versus multiple privilege, a sibling only versus one that included uncles and aunts, a minimum versus no time required waiting for immigration interview, and an annual numbers cap by total and by country vice no cap on the use of this privilege. For example, total annual numbers capped at 10,000 numbers for principals plus their families with not more than 500 numbers plus their families taken by any one country, and the designated sibling's approved immigration petition must be filed at least five years before privilege use.

Such modifications would still generate millions of inquiries, thousands of well-qualified recruits, and a high percentage of reenlistments by eligible service members. The overall increase in foreign-born servicemen serving in the Force would be less rapid. However, recruitment and reenlistment problems would decrease. Many military occupational specialty shortfalls, such as combat arms, would disappear. Recruitment budgets would be slashed. Manning and expanding the Force through immigration would be on its way to reality.

LET THE REVOLUTION BEGIN -- BUILD THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The idea of using the foreign-born in our Armed Forces in return for immigration and citizenship privileges is not new. During the Civil War, to overcome manpower shortages, the Union convinced 144,221 Irishmen and 216,000 Germans to immigrate, enlist, and offered

automatic citizenship to those who served for six years.[83] In June 1950 the 81st Congress passed the Lodge Act, Public Law 957, which made any foreigner, who served honorably in the Armed Forces for at least five years during specific periods and conditions, eligible for US citizenship.[84] This Act enabled Europeans with special technical abilities, but who had never been to the US, to join directly the US Army.[85]

The type of immigration legislation proposed here is different from the Lodge Act and the Union Civil War immigration recruitment. It envisions the creation of an incentive for people, who are already legally admitted into the United States, to serve in regular, existing units of our Armed Forces in return for the right to accelerative the immigration process for relatives already qualified by INS to immigrate. No additional people qualify to immigrate because of this legislation. There is no intent to create all-German units as happened during the Civil War[86] or all-Japanese-American units as happened with the 442nd Regimental Combat Team attached to the 2nd Battalion of the 92nd Infantry Division in WWII.[87] Because the targeted group already has the right of abode in the US, there should be no basis to debate whether the US is creating an American Foreign Legion.

Thus, before defense strategists rationalize the abandonment of the two MTW strategy because of manpower constraints, they should first explore thoroughly the feasibility of overcoming the recruitment/retention challenge through creative use of the immigration tool. With proper immigration incentives, there can be a dramatic increase in the propensity amongst America's foreign-born to enlist and to extend their military service.

Manning the Force through immigration addresses multiple problems important to our national well-being. One, depending on its magnitude, it can solve a persistent military manning problem that thus far has been addressed by lowering quality standards, increasing monetary incentives, and incurring performance risk to get and keep more, but less qualified soldiers. Two, it provides immediate, regular employment to immigrants newly arrived.[88] Three, it accelerates the assimilation and acculturation of recent immigrants into American society.[89] Four, it dissipates partially the inordinate immigration wait time for designated brothers and sisters of Americans and thereby reduces the wait time for all siblings in the immigration 4th Preference Family Preference Category.[90] Five, it should enable Force personnel planners to go forward with proposals to grow the Force to meet the two MTW National Security Strategy. Six, it can provide key pieces to what can now be known of the Army's 2032 Objective Force: Multi-lingual and XX percent foreign born.

In this paper, I suggest several ways to use immigration as a manning tool. Depending on the political capital spent and the actual needs of the Force, tailored immigration law can solve

some, perhaps most of the military's manpower problems. Throughout, I emphasize the positive and but mention some of the negative.

Those familiar with the myriad challenges presented by such a fundamentally new recruitment approach and Force composition demographic will find ample reasons to say why this cannot or should not be done. New national legislation on immigration is hard, not easy. Integrating large numbers of immigrants and naturalized citizens into the Force is hard, not easy. Absorbing multi-cultures, overcoming racism, and dissipating paranoia are hard, not easy. Pro and anti-immigration lobbies are many, experienced, and often unyielding in their positions. Liberal and conservative factions will clash. Yet for those able and willing to look and think through what is suggested here, the light can overcome the dark. This is exciting stuff. Let the revolution begin. Man the Force through Immigration. Pursue the American Dream.

WORD COUNT = 5642

ENDNOTES

[1] Alexander Gerry, "Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, A Study by the National Defense University," ROA National Security Report (January/February 2001):136.

[2] Comment expressed by service member at the Army War College.

[3] Briefings provided to Army War College students by responsible service members, February 2001.

[4] Opinion expressed by service member at the Army War College.

[5]Brian Mitchell, "Is the Draft in Your Future?" Investor's Business Daily, February 19, 1999; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[6] US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001, 103; available from http://www.nssg.gov/PhaseIIIFR.pdf; Internet, accessed 3 March 2001,

[7] Percentage of enlistees who separated during their first terms, on average for all services, increased about 2.5 percent between 1986 and 1991 with Army and Air Force separations up 5 percent. The percentage of enlistees who separated in the first six months of their first terms between 1986 and 1994 increased by about 3 percent. See US General Accounting Office, "Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel (Chapter Report, 01/06/97, GAO/NSAD-97-39);" available from http://www.fas.org/man/gao/ns97039.htm; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[8] Greg Jaffe, "The Military Wages Uphill Battle to Find the Willing and Able," Wall Street Journal, September 23, 1999; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/pd092300b.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[9] US Commission on National Security/21st Century, 102.

[10] Steven Lee Myers, "Good Times Mean Hard Sell for the Military," New York Times, November 3, 1998; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[11] CMS Tom Kuhn, "Reserve Shifting to More Non-Prior Service Recruits," Air Force News; available from http://www.af.mil/news/Aug1996/n19960812_960787.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[12] Andrea Stone, "Recruiting Costs Soar" and "Paying High Price for Preparedness," USA Today, October 22, 1999; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[13] Doug Bandow, "The Volunteer Military: Better than a Draft," Foreign Policy Briefing No. 6, January 8, 1991; available from http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-006.htm1; Internet, accessed 5 November 2000.

[14] Actually, data from the Youth Attitude Tracking Study shows the overall propensity of men 16 to 21 to enlist was little changed between 1994 and 1997. However, there was a big drop in the propensity of Hispanic men in that age group, 43 percent in 1996 versus 37 percent in 1997. Hispanics made up 10 percent on new accessions. See Department of Defense, "24th Annual Department of Defense Report on Social Representation in the U.S. Military Services;" available from http://dticaw.dtic.mil/prhome/poprep97/htm1/overview.htm1; Internet, accessed 14 November 2000.

[15] Mitchell.

[16] Brian Mitchell, "The Armed Forces' Gender Gap," Investor's Business Daily, July 6, 1999; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[17] Andrea Stone, "White Female Enlistees Leaving Military at an Alarming Rate," USA Today, March 15, 1999; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet; accessed 9 November 2000.

[18] Response to questions about recruiting challenges by official visitors to the Army War College.

[19] Opinion expressed by official visitors to the Army War College. The US Commission on National Security/21st Century, citing OSD July 2000 active and reserve recruiting results, disagrees. It states "the military is having even greater difficulty recruiting quality people than the civilian sector of the government." See William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2000), chapter 4.

[20] Department of Defense, "24th Annual Department of Defense Report on Social Representation in the U.S. Military Services."

[21] Andrea Stone, "Army Opens More to School Dropouts, USA Today, February 4, 2000; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/cong9.htm1; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

[22] ST 3.0, Operations, 1 October 2000, I-17

[23] Ibid., I-18.

[24] Stone, "Army Opens More to School Dropouts." In FY 00 the Army increased authorized enlistment of applicants scoring in the IIIB range, 31-49 percentile, of the AFQT. Normally, only applicants scoring in the 50 percentile and above range are adjudged trainable for Army duties.

[25] According to the 24th annual DOD report on social representation in the U.S. Military Services, in FY 97, the proportion of nonprior service "high quality recruits" ranged from 58 percent in the Army to 77 percent in the Air Force. A "high quality recruit" is defined as a high school graduate who scores in the 50-99 percentile range on the AFQT.

[26]Dave Moniz, "This Isn't your Father's Boot Camp Anymore," USA Today, July 19, 2000; available from http://www.ncpa.org/pi/congress/pd071900d.htm1; Internet accessed 9 November 2000.

[27] Response to recruiting question by an Army recruiter.

[28] Moniz.

[29] Response to recruiting questions by official visitors to the Army War College.

[30] This is a best guess estimate. The law provides immigration numbers for 23,400 individuals under family-sponsored First Preference and 26,266 under family-sponsored Second Preference. This totals 49,666 individuals. All are single and 21 years old or older. There are an unknown number of children under 21, but over 17 who immigrate with their parents in other family-sponsored as well as employment-based preference categories. There are an unknown number of employment-based and diversity-based immigrants who are over 21 and single. There are also an unknown number of individuals, who are single and between 17 and 21, who immigrate with their parents, as diversity-based immigrants.

[31] Annual family-preference numbers are limited to 226,220. Annual employment-based numbers are limited to 140,000. Immediate relatives of American citizens, i.e., spouse, parents, and children, are not subject to numerical limitations. In recent years, 55,000 immigrants from "under-represented countries" have immigrated annually based on annual diversity lotteries. Thus, annual immigration totals well over 500,000 individuals.

[32] The 2000 census shows foreign-born numbers and age groups as follows: 15-19 years – 1.6 million, 20-24 years – 2.4 million, 25-29 years – 2.9 million. For males only, the numbers are .8 million, 1.4 million, and 1.5 million respectively. These figures include single and married people.

[33] Michael J. Greenwood, "Immigrants and the U.S. Military: History and Prospects," in Marching Toward the 21st Century – Military Manpower and Recruiting, ed. Mark J. Eitelberg and Stephen L. Mehay, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 98.

[34] Ibid., 102.

[35]Ibid., 97.

[36] Thomas A. Culhane, Jr, Foreign Personnel in Separate Combat Formation of the Armed Forces, Thesis (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 26 March 1956), 16. Culhane cites Ella Lonn's book Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), as reference for his statement the Union used immigration as a tool to recruit Germans and Irishmen residing in Europe into the Union Army.

[37] Watson B. Miller, "Foreign Born in the United States Army During World War II, With Special Reference to the Alien," Interpreter Releases, Vol. XXV, no. 39 (August 11, 1948): 263.

[38] Somini Sengupta, "To More Immigrant New Yorkers, A Better Life Begins in Uniform," New York Times, May 23, 1999, 29.

[39] Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953), 72, 419, 435. Lonn describes how the US routinely used immigration as a means to develop lands in the west. Poor crop harvests and high unemployment, combined with the stoppage of remittances from US relatives at the start of the Civil War, forced many Irishmen to immigrate. Free land for fourteen days in the Union Army or Navy as well as automatic citizenship were additional incentives. Free passage was another incentive.

[40] Greenwood, 98.

[41] According to the 2000 census, two out of every three foreign-born age 25 and over are high school graduates or better. US Census Bureau, "The Foreign-Born Population in the United States," March 2000; available from http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-534.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 January 2001.

[42]Ibid. According to the 2000 census, 4.9 percent of the foreign-born was unemployed versus 4.3 percent of the native-born population.

[43] For bestowing this privilege, the Armed Forces pays basically nothing except time spent on the paperwork. All immigration applications and fees are paid for by the reenlistee or by his immigrating relative. Depending on the number of people availing themselves of the privilege in a particular country, the DOS may be forced to hire additional staff. However, because of tailoring in the legislation, this is considered unlikely. Tailoring should also result in the creation of a situation where familial pressures to reenlist should be overwhelming.

[44] Harold Jordan, "Military Steps Up Drive to Recruit Latinos," February 1999; available from http://www.sheakimbo.com/nymp/youthmil/html/news/latinos_p1.htm; Internet; accessed 9 November 2000.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Selective Service registration is required of every male citizen and legal permanent resident within 30 days of his 18th birthday. Male immigrants, 18 to 22 years of age, are routinely given this form for completion by DOS immigration units overseas.

[48] This is known as Packet 3.

[49] Employers with frequent employee turnover or who have a continuous need for employees with specific skills willing to work under certain work conditions who are not generally available in the work force may be issued a blanket worker shortage certificate by the US Department of Labor. Armed with that certification, the employer can recruit directly overseas for any number of people meeting those skills and conditions of employment. For example, if the Army was chronically short of Arabic linguists with constabulary experience, it could obtain certification and then recruit overseas. The initial phase of this type of recruitment

is cumbersome and time-consuming. However, once a pipeline is established, the flow can be fairly constant.

[50] All prospective immigrants are required to take a physical examination and to submit a police certificate regarding criminal record. For potential recruits, additional checks if required may be conducted, through prior arrangement with the Embassy, by the recruiting service itself or by the Embassy's security office.

[51] Statement made by various service members at the Army War College.

[52]There is no quota or waiting period for immediate relatives of Americans. The only limitation is the time spent getting petition approval, gathering required documents, and scheduling an immigrant visa interview. In recent years, however, INS, which is the petition approving office, has been unable to approve petitions in a timely manner, sometimes taking over 12 months from time of filing until time of actual approval. Thus, some immediate relative beneficiaries must wait well over 12 months before they are scheduled for an interview.

[53] For example, a LPR parent can file a petition for unmarried sons and daughters. If a son is married, the son will divorce his wife to meet the immigration requirement. Once immigrated, the son may remarry his former wife and petition her to immigrate.

[54] The converse is also true. For DOD and the Armed Forces to make maximum use of immigration as a recruitment and reenlistment tool, they must first understand and become very familiar with immigration procedures.

[55] In recent years, INS bureaucratic difficulties have resulted in immigrant visa petitions taking a year or more to adjudicate. After adjudication, another six months of processing is commonplace before a visa to come to the US is issued.

[56] See US DOS, "Immigrant Numbers for March 2001," February 7, 2001; available from http://www.VisaBulletin@state.gov; Internet; accessed 10 March 2001.

[57] Under US immigration law, marriage makes a son or daughter ineligible to immigrate with his or her parents.

[58] Information obtained during November 1999 meeting with Chinese Public Security Bureau officials in Fuzhou, Fujian.

[59] Section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets an annual minimum family-sponsored preference limit of 226,000. The worldwide level for annual employment-based preference immigrants is at least 140,000. Section 202 prescribes that the per-country limit for preference immigrants is set at 7% of the total annual family-sponsored and employment-based preference limits, i.e., 25,620. Section 203 of the INA prescribes preference classes for allotment of immigrant visas as described in Table 1.

[60] Through constituency pressures, the Congress for some time has been sensitive to the long wait time required by certain family relation groups to immigrate. Thus, in 2000 a new nonimmigrant visa was created to reduce separation times for spouses, children, and parents of

Americans (Immediate Relative Preference) as well as the spouses and unmarried children of legal permanent residents (2nd Preference). However, the married siblings and their families of Americans (4th Preference) were not included in this new immigration provision. They must continue to wait about 12 years for an immigrant visa interview.

[61] Eilleen Bolger, "Background History of the United States Naturalization Process," Colorado State Archives; available from http://www.archives.state.co.us/natinfo.htm; Internet; accessed 5 November 2000.

[62] In creating the new nonimmigrant V visa in 2000 for immediate relatives of Americans and spouses and unmarried children of legal permanent residents, the Congress recognized immigrant visa processing for these groups takes too long. Thus, as a defense readiness, national security issue, the Congress may well be very receptive to the idea of a special immigrant visa privilege for US servicemen relatives.

[63] This bonus is priceless. It gets a relative and his family to the US a minimum six years ahead of time. In China, people wanting to immigrate and live in the US routinely pay over $50,000 per person to immigrate illegally.

[64] Statement by Army recruiter during February 2001 interview. In exchange for English training, enlistee foregoes choice of military training.

[65] The Army currently pays up to 24 months of monthly stipends for recruits to attend college prior to entering the service. This incentive may be modifiable to include English and other necessary classes.

[66] Current regulations restrict the officer ranks to US citizens. LPRs may only serve in the enlisted ranks. Certain jobs, such as military intelligence, may require US citizenship.

[67] Judith Graham, ed. Current Biography Yearbook 1995 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1995), 527.

[68] For this bonus privilege, the Armed Forces pays basically nothing except time and paperwork. All immigration applications and fees are paid for by the reenlistee or by his immigrating sibling. It is unlikely that immigration volume generated by this privilege in any one country will be large enough to necessitate the employment of additional staff by the US embassy to process these cases.

[69] Recognizing the inordinate time it takes to reunite families through immigration, the Congress in 2000 passed and the President signed new immigration legislation, which gives new priority rights to immediate relatives of Americans, who have waited more than twelve months for petition approval, and to the spouses and children of legal permanent residents whose immigrant visa petitions have been pending immigrant visa interview for three or more years. These groups now have the right to receive nonimmigrant visas to live and work in the United States pending final processing of their cases. As a practical matter, however, the Department of State as yet to finalize processing procedures for this visa.

[70] The push to immigrate to the US is intense. Every year, according to the Census Bureau, about 200,000 illegal aliens enter the US. Over the last ten years, US media reports of boatloads of Cuban, Haitian, Chinese, and Vietnamese migrants intercepted by our Coast Guard as well as the tragic stories of dead migrants discovered in cargo containers and other conveyances have been commonplace. Annual diversity lotteries conducted by the DOS to allow foreigners born in certain countries to immigrate legally to the US attract millions of applicants. The Lodge Act of 1950, which offered the right to apply for US citizenship in return for military service, is another example. Thus, while there is no guarantee this legislation will generate substantially more enlistments and reenlistments from the foreign-born group, there are sufficient indicators to suggest this will in fact happen.

[71] Known as the "Legal Immigration Family Equity Act" or "LIFE Act."

[72] The DOS has not yet determined how to implement this new provision of law. The law is known as the "Legal Immigration Family Equity Act" or "LIFE Act."

[73] According to some political observers, the "LIFE Act" passed by the 106th Congress in November 2000 was a compromise between Republicans and the Democratic Hispanic Caucus to enable aliens of Hispanic-origin to remain legally in the US while they wait for legal permanent resident status.

[74] According to the 2000 census, there are 36.4 million African Americans and 35.3 million Hispanics in the US. The Hispanic population grew 12.9 million or 58 percent, primarily through immigration and better counting, over the 1990 census where as the black population increased only 6.4 million or 20 percent. See "D'Vera Cohn and Darryl Fears, "Hispanics Draw Even With Blacks In New Census," The Washington Post, March 7, 2001, 1.

[75] US Census Bureau, "Current Population Survey," March 2000; available from http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/foreign/p20-534/tab0301.txt; Internet; accessed 16 February 2001.

[76] US Census Bureau, "The Foreign-Born Population in the United States," March 2000; available from http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20-534.pdf; Internet; accessed 19 January 2001.

[77] It is a constant battle between the US government and the visa "facilitators" of the world. For every anti-fraud measure or new immigration program undertaken, there is an almost instant reaction on the part of the facilitator to assist immigration clients. For example, various safeguards built into US visas and passports are routinely attacked by counterfeiters. During the illegal immigrant amnesty program implemented under President Carter, to establish US physical presence, facilitators created multiyear wage, rent, and phone receipts to prove the illegal, who usually lives anonymously and without documentation, was living in the United States during the requisite amnesty period.

[78] US Department of State Deputy Spokesman Philip T, Reeker, "Results of the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV-2001)," public release statement, Washington, D.C., 23 June 2000.

[79] Ibid.

[80] According to an Army recruiter, LPRs are eligible for all military jobs except signal and military intelligence, which require upgraded security clearance and citizenship. The kind of slots needed to be filled varies from month to month, but he thought anyone wanting to enlist in the combat arms field would be welcomed. With reenlistment, naturalization, and suitable security clearance, OCS as well as signal and military intelligence positions may be possible later in the service member's career.

[81] In FY 99 the Armed Forces spent $1.8 billion to recruit 186,000 active duty recruits, an average of $9,122 per recruit. The Army led the way spending $11,000+ per recruit and still missed its goal by 6300 recruits. The Air Force spent $5,403 per recruit and missed its goal by 1700 recruits. The Navy spent $8,835 per recruit and reached its goal. The Marine Corps spent $6.006 per recruit and reached its goal. Costs were expected to increase in FY 00. See Andrea Stone, "Military Recruiting Costs Soar" and "Paying High Price for Preparedness," USA Today, October 22, 1999.

If the "immigration incentive privilege" is successful, other military incentives can be reduced. As stated elsewhere, getting a relative to the head of the immigration queue costs the Services only the time and support necessary to produce the eligibility certificate for the service member. All other expenses are paid for by the service member or his relatives. Theoretically, if the percentage of LPRs and naturalized citizens enlisting and remaining in the military because of this new privilege grows from zero today to target levels of 5 percent of all recruits and service members one year after implementation, 10 percent after year three, and 15 percent after year five, recruitment and retention incentives currently offered can be significantly modified. For example, the Army's $50,000 for college for four years of service could be modified to six years of service. Concurrently, the number of personnel devoted to recruitment and retention activities could be reduced.

[82] Throughout most of the 90s, the Services had difficulty recruiting the numbers and kinds of people it wanted. With changes in recruiting tactics in FY 00 and 01, they appear ready to meet quotas for a second consecutive year. However, it has been a continuous struggle wrought with compromises. A study comparing the 1994 and 1997 propensity of the 16-21 years of age male population to enlist in the Services showed little change, but revealed that the propensity among Hispanic males had dropped six percent. See DOD, "24th Annual DOD Report on Social Representation in the U.S. Military Services."

With an immigration incentive privilege for the newly arrived immigrants and naturalized citizens with close relatives abroad, the propensity decline among Hispanic men, assuming they were eligible, would likely reverse itself and probably increase significantly over former levels. The propensity to enlist among all immigrant groups would also increase. Thus, even if the propensity among multi-generational, native-born Americans remained unchanged, the overall propensity and total of potential enlistees would rise. With more people staying in to take advantage of the privilege, fewer recruits would be needed to replenish the Force. However, as more people would be interested in enlisting, if authorized by Congress, more people could be enlisted, thereby growing Force size.

[83] Culhane, 16, 26.

[84] The Lodge Act of June 30, 1950, Public Law 597, provided for the enlistment of aliens in the Regular Army.

[85] Recruitment under the Lodge Act ended in 1959.

[86] According to Laura Lonn in Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy, 36,000 Germans served in German regiments or batteries commanded by German officers during the War.

[87] The 442nd Regimental Combat Team consisted almost entirely of Japanese-Americans.

[88] According to the 2000 census, 4.9 percent of the foreign born in the civilian labor force was unemployed compared with 4.3 percent of the native born population. See US Census Bureau, "The Foreign-Born Population in the United States," March 2000, p. 5.

[89] According to the 2000 census, the foreign born are likely to live in "a central city" in a metropolitan area, 45.1 percent, compared with 27.5 percent for native born Americans. The percentage of foreign born living outside the metropolitan area, 5.1 percent, was also significantly smaller than the percentage of native born Americans, 20.7 percent. See US Census Bureau, "The Foreign-Born Population in the United States," March 2000. Thus, you have urban immigrant ghettos such as San Francisco and New York's Chinatowns. Here, new immigrants attempt to establish themselves with the help of relatives and ethnic social organizations built to smooth their transition into the American mainstream. Unfortunately, the organizations, especially if their members are non-English speaking, often inhibit immigrant interaction with the general American community.

While some studies note a widening gap between the military and civilian societies, the traditional American values found in the military – self-sacrifice, honesty, respect for lawful authority, physical and moral courage, and loyalty to comrades, group, and nation – are time honored, cherished traits that helped build America, but which, in the opinion of conservative commentators, are disappearing from today's general society. Thus, in this regard the military provides a better milieu than regular society for immigrants to learn "traditional" American values. Upon completion of service, they will take these values with them into the civilian world where they can exert influence and perhaps help rebuild the traditional fabric of American society. See The Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2000), 64. Also see Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, 66; and Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996, " International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/99): 8.

[90] The current immigration system is unable to accommodate world demand. For example, the 4th Preference Category has a minimum twelve year waiting period. This period is expected to lengthen in the years ahead. As immigration reform is a perennial topic for Congressional consideration, a DOD proposal relating Force expansion with accelerated immigration for prospective immigrants already waiting in line would generate serious Congressional attention, especially with those Congressmen with significant Hispanic constituencies. See Endnotes 73 and 74.

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